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NOTE
THEPRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD:
UNDERSTANDING THEPUBLIC INTEREST FACTOR
MDevon Moore*
Under Winter v. NRDC, federal courts considering a preliminary injunction
motion look to four factors, including the public interest impact of the injunc-
tion . But courts do not agree on what the public interest is and how much it
should matter . This Note describes the confusion over the public interest fac-
tor and characterizes the post-Winter circuit split as a result of this confu-
sion . By analyzing the case law surrounding the public interest factor, this
Note identifies three aspects of a case that consistently implicate the direction
and magnitude of this factor: the identity of the parties, the underlying cause
of action, and the scope of injunctive relief . By centering the public interest
factor on these three aspects, courts and litigants will achieve a unified con-
ception of the public interest factor .
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INTRODUCTION
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. In recent years,
courts granted preliminary injunctions to protect trade secrets,1 put a new
candidate on a state ballot,2 resolve commercial disputes,3 and even halt en-
forcement of an executive order.4 Given the power of a preliminary injunc-
tion, it is important that courts grant them in appropriate circumstances. In
Winter v . Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc . (NRDC), the Supreme
Court provided courts with such a framework, clarifying that the decision to
grant a preliminary injunction depends, among other factors, upon whether
“an injunction is in the public interest.”5
Despite Winter’s framework and the inclusion of the public interest fac-
tor in that framework, the content and weight of the public interest factor
lack clarity. For example, Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure
offers only anecdotal advice on what courts might consider in assessing this
factor.6 And a survey of circuit and district court opinions shows a variety of
approaches for weighing this factor and the circumstances in which an in-
junction is or is not in the public interest.7 Although the public interest is
just one factor in the preliminary injunction analysis, the sheer power of a
preliminary injunction demands that this factor be better understood.
This Note inspects the unstructured and often conflicting articulations
of the public interest factor. It proposes guidelines for determining in what
circumstances “a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.”8 Part I ex-
plores the history of the preliminary injunction, with an emphasis on the
flexibility employed by courts of equity. Part II examines the state of the pre-
liminary injunction post-Winter, which reveals that the disagreement be-
1. PEO Experts CA, Inc. v. Engstrom, No. 2:17–cv–00318–KJM–CKD, 2017 WL
4181130 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017).
2. United Utah Party v. Cox, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Utah 2017).
3. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
4. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.), vacated as
moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
5. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
6. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.4
(3d ed. 2011) (noting further that “[c]onsiderable ingenuity appears to be exercised to find an
exception to these restrictions when compelling cases for interlocutory relief are presented”).
7 . See infra Part II.
8. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555
U.S. at 20).
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tween circuit courts applying Winter largely comes from how the courts
weigh the public interest factor. Part III provides flexible structural guide-
lines for assessing the public interest implications of a preliminary injunc-
tion. These rules provide a basic framework for the public interest factor
while preserving equitable discretion and flexibility.
I. THEROAD TOWINTER
The present-day notion of a preliminary injunction, described in
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure9 and outlined in Winter v .
NRDC,10 evolved from a history of equitable remedies fashioned by the Eng-
lish Court of Chancery.11 That history elucidates the Supreme Court’s for-
mulation of the preliminary injunction standard in Winter. This Part pays
particular regard to the historical constraints on injunctive relief12 and the
considerations that influence lower courts’ applications of theWinter test.13
A. Equitable Origins of the Preliminary Injunction
Preliminary injunctions have always been an equitable remedy. Courts
of equity, not law, had jurisdiction to grant preliminary injunctions to pro-
tect rights “from irreparable or at least from serious damage pending the trial
of the legal right.”14 That is, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary in-
junction was a purely equitable one.15
Early definitions of preliminary injunctions resemble modern formula-
tions in several important ways. In his 1927 overview of injunctions, William
Williamson Kerr wrote, “The interlocutory injunction is merely provisional
in its nature, and does not conclude a right. The effect and object of the in-
terlocutory injunction is merely to keep matters in statu quo until the hear-
ing or further order.”16 Modern authorities on federal civil procedure mirror
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
10. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
11. Rachel A. Weisshaar, Note, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split over
Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1018 (2012).
12. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319
(1999) (finding that federal courts had no jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief sought be-
cause the type of relief requested was not “traditionally accorded by the courts of equity”).
13 . See Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1286 (10th
Cir. 2016) (“In exercising equitable discretion over motions for temporary relief, courts cannot
woodenly employ a one size fits all mindset.”).
14. WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INJUNCTIONS 15 (6th ed. 1927). Before the merger of federal law and equity courts in 1938,
courts of equity “based decisions on general principles of fairness in situations where rigid ap-
plication of common-law rules would have brought about injustice.” Jurisdiction: Equity, FED.
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-equity [https://perma.cc/P8AG-
P5MU].
15 . See KERR, supra note 14, at 15.
16 . Id . at 2 (citation omitted).
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Kerr’s language.17 Both early and modern definitions identify a common
purpose of the preliminary injunction: ensuring that final relief will be pos-
sible at the end of the trial.
Because of these equitable roots, rulings on preliminary injunctions em-
phasized both flexibility and fact specificity. Early courts often remarked that
preliminary injunctive relief required a careful consideration of facts with a
specific aversion to mechanical and deterministic applications of some rule.18
This emphasis on flexibility might have reflected a desire to maintain comity
between courts of equity and courts of law.19 Courts of equity were reluctant
to pass judgment on the underlying merits of a claim regarding a legal right,
lest they impermissibly express an opinion on the proceedings of a court of
law.20 This flexibility is a common thread in many early cases discussing pre-
liminary injunctions.
There is also case law from this early period distinguishing mandatory
injunctions from prohibitory injunctions.21 This is perhaps related to the no-
tion of maintaining the status quo;22 courts sought to prevent a party from
acting, instead of compelling action.23 Though this consideration is absent
from Winter, it still appears in some district court opinions.24 It accounts for
some of the disparity between the circuits in applying theWinter test.
Crucially, early chancery courts sometimes considered the impact on
nonparties of granting preliminary injunctive relief.25 For example, in 1823
the High Court of Chancery in Scotland reviewed a preliminary injunction
concerning literary rights over an unpublished book.26 The ruling explained
that when in need of a tiebreaker, courts should consider “[w]hether the
17 . See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2947 (“[A] preliminary injunction is an injunc-
tion that is issued to protect a plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the court’s pow-
er to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.”); Preliminary Injunction,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A temporary injunction issued . . . to prevent an
irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance to decide the case.”).
18 . See KERR, supra note 14, at 10–12.
19. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525,
530–31 (1978).
20 . Id . at 535.
21 . See Longwood Valley R.R. Co. v. Baker, 27 N.J. Eq. 166, 171 (N.J. Ch. 1876) (“The
court will not, however, interfere by mandatory injunction, unless extreme or very serious
damage, at least, will ensue from withholding that relief . . . .”).
22. KERR, supra note 14; see also Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Navigation (1832)
39 Eng. Rep. 639; 1 My. & K. 154 (noting a preference for maintaining the facts of the case “in
statu quo”).
23. Gale v. Abbott (1862) 6 LT 852; 8 Jur. N.S. 987 (noting that a mandatory injunction
was inappropriate before a final hearing on the merits).
24 . See, e .g ., Ball Dynamics Int’l, LLC v. Saunders, No. 16–cv–00482–NYW, 2016 WL
7034974, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 1, 2016); Hellerstein v. Desert Lifestyles, LLC, No. 15-cv-01804-
RFB-CWH, 2015WL 6962862, at *13 (D. Nev. Nov. 10, 2015).
25 . See, e .g ., Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the High Court of Chancery, 38
EDINBURGH REV. 281, 296 (1823).
26 . Id . at 281.
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public, in a case nearly balanced, has any interest either way.”27 Clear con-
cern for the public interest was rare compared to the public interest concern
of twentieth-century legislation and litigation. But those formulations show
that courts have long considered the interests of the public at large as part of
preliminary injunction analysis, and they provide historical grounding for
public interest analysis in theWinter standard.
B. Preliminary Injunctions in the Modern Age
Standards for preliminary injunctive relief remained varied throughout
the twentieth century despite earlier attempts to develop a uniform frame-
work.28 The courts of law and equity merged in 1934,29 and while courts con-
tinued to treat a preliminary injunction as an equitable measure,30 even Su-
preme Court decisions suffered from inconsistencies.31 Though many courts
listed the same four key factors,32 there was little consistency in the precise
definition of each factor.33 Further, some courts maintained that preliminary
injunctions existed to preserve the status quo. Or prohibitory preliminary
27 . Id . at 296.
28 . Compare Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1948) (“A tem-
porary injunction should usually be granted where the questions presented are grave and inju-
ry to the moving party will result if it is denied and the final determination should be in his
favor.”), with G.F. Heublein & Bro. v. Bushmill Wine & Prods. Co., 39 F. Supp. 549, 551 (M.D.
Pa. 1941) (“A preliminary injunction should be issued only where the proof is clear or undis-
puted or where withholding the preliminary injunction clearly would be more damaging to the
moving party than to the defendant in the motion.”).
29 . See 28 U.S.C. § 723(c) (1934).
30 . See, e .g ., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440–42 (1944) (justifying a fact-
specific approach to preliminary injunctive relief as rooted in the traditional practice of courts
of equity).
31 . See, e .g ., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (explaining that the “tra-
ditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the
absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on
the merits,” but failing to mention public interest considerations in a case regarding a local
obscenity ordinance).
32 . See Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 539. That is, the four factors later captured in Win-
ter: “[T]ypically the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, the prospect of irreparable
harm, the comparative hardship to the parties of granting or denying relief, and sometimes the
impact of relief on the public interest.” Id . at 525.
33. Consider the balance-of-equities factor. This factor is sometimes described the fac-
tor as measuring any harm to any person besides the moving party. See, e .g ., Friendship Mate-
rials, Inc. v. Mich. Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Whether the issuance of a
preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others.”). Other courts instead focused
only on harm to the defendant. See, e .g ., Direx Isr., Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d
802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991) (describing the factor as measuring “the likelihood of harm to the de-
fendant if the requested relief is granted”). Still other courts restricted this factor to considera-
tions of irreparable harm only. See, e .g ., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380,
387 (7th Cir. 1984) (“In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court must
also consider any irreparable harm that the defendant might suffer from the injunction . . . .”).
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injunctions were favored over mandatory ones. Other courts made no men-
tion of these background preferences.34
A truly unified standard only emerged in the Supreme Court’s recent ar-
ticulation of the preliminary injunction standard in 2008’s Winter v . NRDC.
In Winter, the court outlined a four-part test for motions for preliminary in-
junctive relief. A “plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer ir-
reparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public inter-
est.”35 But Winter lacks any discussion of the status quo or an emphasis on
prohibitory injunctions. Also absent, at least from the majority opinion, is a
discussion of the equitable origins of the preliminary injunction, which em-
phasized flexibility.36
In the decade since Winter, the Supreme Court has not provided any
further guidance on how to apply the four-factor standard.37 Although the
Court has considered several other cases involving preliminary injunctions,
the cases have not required recapitulation of the full preliminary injunction
standard test.38 Thus, the Court has not had occasion to endorse or reject
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting remark in Winter that “courts have evaluated
claims for equitable relief on a ‘sliding scale,’ . . . . This Court has never re-
jected that formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.”39 Lower
courts, however, have had plenty of opportunities to apply the Winter test,
and their divergent approaches reveal that a truly unified standard remains
elusive.
II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS&PUBLIC INTERESTAFTERWINTER
Even after Winter, lower courts continue to disagree on the correct ap-
plication of that standard. In fact, circuits were still refining interpretations
of Winter as recently as 2017.40 While it is difficult to neatly divide these cir-
cuit court decisions, this Note categorizes the presently employed tests into
three schools: the sequential test, the threshold test, and the sliding-scale
34 . Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 525.
35. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
36. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg devotes several paragraphs to a discussion
of the equitable preference for flexible standards. Id . at 51–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. Lower courts thus rely on Winter in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive
relief.
38 . See, e .g ., Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (per curiam); Trump v. Int’l Ref-
ugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
39 . Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
40 . See, e .g ., Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017) (“We are
aware there is an inconsistent line of cases within our Court holding that all four [preliminary
injunction] factors must be established by the movant and the ‘failure to establish any element
in its favor renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.’ ”).
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test.41 These tests vary as to the burden and weight accorded to each of the
fourWinter factors, particularly the public interest factor.42
Lower courts have exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding the Winter
factors by articulating incompatible explanations of what exactly the public
interest factor encompasses.43 These two issues, (1) the post-Winter circuit
split and (2) the lack of a clear framework for the public interest factor, are
related. As this Part explains, the various circuit court applications ofWinter
differ in two ways: the relative weight of the public interest factor and the al-
location of the burden of proof. Variation in the weight given to the factor
results from uncertainty about its content. If judges cannot reliably discern
what the public interest factor should include, they might hesitate to give
that factor too much weight. Scholarship on the post-Winter split has largely
focused on endorsing the “best” application of the preliminary injunction
test.44 But absent a clear understanding of what elements the public interest
factor includes, it is difficult for courts to consistently weigh that factor
against the rest. This Part first summarizes the post-Winter circuit split and
then focuses on district and appellate court articulations of the public inter-
est factor.
A. The State of the Post-Winter Circuit Split
In Winter, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the Ninth Circuit’s
“possibility” standard, which permitted a plaintiff to show a mere possibility,
and not a likelihood, of irreparable harm.45 In doing so, the Court articulated
the familiar standard that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is like-
ly to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public
41. I borrow the sequential, threshold, and sliding-scale terms from other literature on
the post-Winter circuit split, specifically Weisshaar, supra note 11, at 1032–34.
42. These differences are discussed more comprehensively in Section A of this Part, in-
fra. Incidentally, theWinter court admonished the lower court for considering the injunction’s
public interest consequences “in only a cursory fashion.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 26. Although the
majority opinion in Winter spends several paragraphs assessing the public interest conse-
quence of impeding Navy exercises, the majority offers no guidance to structure public interest
analysis in future cases. Id . at 24–26.
43 . Compare EUSA Pharma (US), Inc. v. Innocoll Pharm. Ltd., 594 F. Supp. 2d 570, 583
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (requiring that plaintiff “show that the public interest favors granting a prelim-
inary injunction”), with Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Hoops Enter., No. C 10–2769 CW, 2012 WL
6303358, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2011) (“[T]he relevant question for this factor is whether the
proposed injunction will disserve the public interest, not whether it will promote the public
interest.”).
44 . See, e .g ., Taylor Payne, Now Is the Winter of Ginsburg’s Dissent: Unifying the Circuit
Split as to Preliminary Injunctions and Establishing a Sliding Scale Test, 13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y
15 (2018); Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L REV. 1522 (2011).
45 . Winter, 555 U.S. at 21–22.
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interest.”46 The circuit courts’ approaches to Winter can be roughly grouped
into three distinct tests: the sequential test, the threshold test, and the slid-
ing-scale test. Each of those three tests, which vary in rigidity and weight of
each factor, are addressed in turn below.
The most rigid application of Winter is the sequential test.47 Courts that
utilize the sequential test draw two additional requirements from the Winter
opinion. First, the plaintiff48 bears the burden of proof on all four factors.49
Second, and notwithstanding the opinion’s later mention of the need to
“balance” and “weigh” certain considerations, the plaintiff must prove all
four factors.50 Failure to prove any one factor is fatal to the plaintiff’s motion.
The Fourth Circuit has explicitly endorsed the sequential test.51 In Real
Truth About Obama v . FEC, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected its prior
test, which permitted “flexible interplay” among the preliminary injunction
factors,52 in favor of a more rigid test that requires the plaintiff to prove each
individual factor.53 It explained that “Winter articulates four requirements,
each of which must be satisfied as articulated.”54 Other circuits, including the
Second, Fifth, and Tenth, have issued opinions that appear to endorse the
sequential test.55 Although no circuit goes as far as the Fourth Circuit in ex-
plicitly requiring the plaintiff to prove each of the four Winter factors, they
all strongly imply that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on each indi-
vidual factor.56
The second test is the threshold test. After several post-Winter opinions
using the sequential test,57 the Third Circuit recently abandoned it in favor of
this alternative test in Reilly v . City of Harrisburg.58 The threshold test re-
quires the plaintiff to prove only the first two Winter factors: likelihood of
success on the merits and likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunc-
46 . Id . at 20.
47. Weisshaar, supra note 11, at 1032 n.133.
48. For the purpose of this Note, the terms plaintiff and movant are used interchangea-
bly in the preliminary injunction context, though in some cases the defendants are the moving
party. See, e .g ., 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Grewal, 60 F. Supp. 3d 272, 286–87 (D. Mass. 2014).
49 . See Winter, 555 U.S. at 19, 27.
50 . Id . at 20, 24.
51. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on
other grounds, 555 U.S. 1089 (2010).
52 . Id . at 347.
53 . Id .
54 . Id .
55 . See, e .g ., Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 723 (10th Cir. 2016); Def. Distributed v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2016); ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 825 (2d Cir.
2015).
56 . See Real Truth About Obama, 575 F.3d at 347; see also Fish, 840 F.3d at 723; Def .
Distributed, 838 F.3d at 458; Clapper, 785 F.3d at 825.
57 . See, e .g ., Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
2014).
58. 858 F.3d 173, 177–79 (3d Cir. 2017).
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tion.59 Upon such a showing, the court then “balance[s] those four [Winter]
factors” in determining whether to grant or deny the preliminary injunction
motion.60 The Reilly court explained that “no test for considering prelimi-
nary equitable relief should be so rigid as to diminish, let alone disbar, dis-
cretion.”61 By lowering the plaintiff’s burden from four factors to two, the
threshold test necessarily frames the balance of equities and public interest
factors as secondary concerns. While Reilly lessens the weight accorded to
those two factors, the opinion does not contain a discussion or analysis of
their content.62 The Third Circuit is unique among the circuits in its adop-
tion of the threshold test.63
Finally, the sliding-scale test is the most flexible interpretation of Win-
ter. This test permits a holistic balancing of the fourWinter factors and notes
that “these are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites to be met.”64 Like the
threshold test, the requirements for the public interest and balance-of-
equities factors are relaxed under the sliding-scale test.65 This test takes the
threshold test a step further; under this analysis, a strong showing on one
factor can offset a weaker showing on any other.66 This allows courts to make
a “flexible consideration” of the four Winter factors.67 For example, a plain-
tiff with a near-certain win on the merits may prevail on a motion for pre-
liminary injunctive relief with a relatively weak likelihood of irreparable
harm. Although the sliding-scale test may appear to be in tension with the
59 . Reilly, 858 F.3d at 177–79.
60 . Id . at 176.
61 . Id . at 178.
62 . Id . at 176–79.
63. Though the Reilly court noted that “other circuits have agreed with our reading of
Winter,” id . at 178 (citing Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins.
Co., 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009), and League of Women Voters of the United States v. Newby,
838 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016)), the cases the court cites actually use the sliding-scale test. For ex-
ample, the D.C. Circuit endorsed a sliding-scale test, holding that a “party seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction must make a clear showing that four factors, taken together, warrant relief.”
League of Women Voters of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
64 . See S. Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849
(6th Cir. 2017).
65. Judge Easterbrook explains this facet of the sliding-scale test in Hoosier Energy.
“How strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance of harms: the more net
harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still
supporting some preliminary relief.” Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock
Life Ins. Co.,, 582 F. 3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009).
66. Notwithstanding this flexibility, a plaintiff who establishes no likelihood of success
on the merits or cannot demonstrate irreparable harm is unlikely to prevail, even under the
sliding-scale test. But a low likelihood of success on the merits might still be offset by a compel-
ling public interest analysis or showing of irreparable harm. See id .
67 . See Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 826 F.3d
1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2016).
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plain text of Winter, the dissent in Winter made clear that the majority did
not explicitly discard this approach.68
In light of the circuit split post-Winter, several scholars have attempted
to analyze and resolve the differences between the circuits.69 The scholarship
in this area is creative, informative, and thorough but tends to follow a simi-
lar recipe for describing and resolving the post-Winter split. Generally, each
author articulates and defends a preference for one test and concludes that
the Supreme Court should further clarify the Winter standard by specifically
endorsing that test.70
In reaching conclusions about which tests courts should adopt, the exist-
ing literature on the post-Winter circuit split overlooks a fundamental issue
driving the divide—courts have not articulated a clear conception of the
public interest factor. Specifically, the difference between the sequential test
and other applications of Winter is whether the plaintiff is required to make
a showing connecting the requested relief with the public interest. Although
some authors have recognized problems with the public interest factor in
specific types of cases,71 the content of the public interest factor has not been
thoroughly addressed. The uncertain dimensions of the public interest factor
impact the degree to which courts require plaintiffs to prove the factor. This
uncertainty shortchanges the nonparty interests that this factor is designed
to protect and leads to lukewarm arguments about the public interest.72 It is
not clear that a more coherent public interest factor will lead to more or few-
er preliminary injunctions. What is clear is that a more structured approach
to this factor will ensure that courts thoroughly consider public interests in
preliminary injunction cases.
68. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing).
69 . See, e .g ., Bates, supra note 44; see also Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the
New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997 (2015); Weisshaar supra note 11.
70. For example, Weisshaar, supra note 11, at 1017, suggests that the Court should
adopt the “sequential test it stated in Winter” with a limited exception for plaintiffs who
demonstrate “compelling circumstances” going to the merits.
71 . E .g ., Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of
Values and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427 (2011); Ryan Griffin, Note, Litigat-
ing the Contours of Constitutionality: Harmonizing Equitable Principles and Constitutional
Values when Considering Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 94 MINN. L. REV. 839 (2010).
72. This is not mere hyperbole—parties do ignore the public interest factor. Consider
Benisek v . Lamone, a recent Supreme Court preliminary injunction case about gerrymandering
in Maryland. 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018). Despite the fact that this was a preliminary injunction
case, the appellant failed to mention the “public interest” in their briefing, Brief of Appellants,
Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (No. 17-333), while appellees made only a passing
reference to the factor. Brief of Appellees at 60, Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (No.
17-333).
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B. The Public Interest Factor in Action
The body of literature on the public interest is immense. The literature
ranges from broad conceptions73 to niche areas of the law,74 but none of it
has focused on the public interest in the preliminary injunction context.75
This Section surveys discussions of the public interest factor, with an empha-
sis on the concerns judges identify in deciding motions for preliminary in-
junctive relief.
As a preliminary matter, it is not clear whether a preliminary injunction
must further the public interest or whether it can instead merely leave the
public interest as is. On the one hand, Winter seems to support an affirma-
tive, pro–public interest impact. That is, “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish . . . that an injunction is in the public interest.”76 In
contrast, some courts articulate the standard using a do-no-harm formula-
tion, which requires the plaintiff to show only that “if issued, the injunction
would not be adverse to the public interest.”77 Though the distinction may
appear insignificant, it matters in two important ways. First, a public inter-
est–neutral preliminary injunction case (i.e., one that is not, strictly speak-
ing, in the public interest) would fail the affirmative formulation but pass the
do-no-harm one. Second, the combination of the sequential test and the af-
firmative formulation of the public interest factor means that a plaintiff loses
the motion if she cannot prove that the injunction is in furtherance of the
public interest. In both instances, the exact standard that the court uses has
the potential to determine the outcome of a case. A plaintiff required to
prove that an injunction furthers the public interest faces a high burden, es-
pecially in cases with little to no impact on nonparties. More troubling still is
the lack of consistency across circuits; if judges follow their own circuit’s re-
quirements to the letter, entire categories of cases (such as private employ-
ment disputes or suits arising from commercial contracts) might be beyond
the reach of preliminary injunctions absent some atypical public interest im-
plication.
To see how this distinction matters, consider Main Street Baseball.78 In
that case, a plaintiff-buyer sought to enjoin the owners of several minor
73 . E .g ., 1 BRUCEACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993).
74 . E .g ., Amber L. Weeks, Student Article, Defining the Public Interest: Administrative
Narrowing and Broadening of the Public Interest in Response to the Statutory Silence of Water
Codes, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255 (2010).
75. That is not to say that “public interest” takes on some special meaning in the prelim-
inary injunction context. Rather, given the immense power courts hold in granting preliminary
injunctions, litigants deserve a clear understanding of how to prove that this factor is on their
side.
76. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
77. Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, 810 F.3d 767, 774 (11th Cir. 2015).
78. Main St. Baseball, LLC v. Binghamton Mets Baseball Club, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 244
(N.D.N.Y. 2015).
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league baseball teams from completing a sale of their assets.79 The court
found that a plaintiff must show “that the public interest [is] not disserviced”
by the grant of the injunction.80 The matter was a private contractual dis-
pute, and the court concluded that the decision was unlikely to have much
impact on nonparties. The court then found that there was no public interest
at stake, so the factor favored the plaintiff.81 After considering the otherWin-
ter factors, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief.82 Had
the Main Street Baseball court instead required affirmative proof that the
preliminary injunction furthered the public interest, plaintiffs could have
lost the injunction motion. Given the ubiquity of commercial contract dis-
putes involving “a question of purely private interest,”83 this distinction has
significant implications.84
Another problem stems from the interaction of the public interest factor
with the balance of equities factor of the Winter test. The confusion stems
from whether the balance-of-equities factor encompasses public interest
concerns or if, instead, the factor should focus only on harm to the parties.
For example, some courts articulate the balance of equities as a balance of
the harm the desired injunction would cause to the defendant against the
harm that the plaintiff would suffer in the absence of the injunction.85 But
other iterations of the balance of equities factor blur the line between the
two, leading to substantial overlap in certain cases.86 Still other opinions dis-
cuss the public interest factor as encompassing the aggregated concerns of
nonparties, leaving the balance of equities to cover the interests of moving
and nonmoving parties.87 This confusion leaves parties ill equipped to brief
79 . Id .
80 . Id . at 253 (cleaned up).
81 . Id . Note that private disputes can implicate the public at large. This is particularly
true when the private dispute has the potential to affect nonparties, as discussed in Section
III.B.1, infra.
82 . Main St . Baseball, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 262. (“Neither party has called to the court’s
attention any public interest that would be served or disserved by granting an injunction. Nor
do any such interests appear to be at stake.”).
83 . Id . at 263.
84. And courts do rule this way. See, e .g ., N. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Team-
sters, No. 04-CV-9949 (KMK), 2005 WL 926969, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2005) (“This case
does not appear to implicate the public interest as it is essentially ‘a purely private litiga-
tion.’ . . . Thus, this factor further counsels in favor of denying the motion.” (quoting Greenige
v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 02 Civ.9796 JCF, 2003 WL 22871905, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2003))).
85 . See, e .g ., Rhinehart v. Scutt, 509 F. App’x 510, 515 (6th Cir. 2013) (limiting the bal-
ance of equities factor to the harm suffered by the parties).
86 . See NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 270 F. Supp. 3d 939, 955 (E.D. Tex.) (“[The public
interest] factor overlaps substantially with the balance-of-hardships requirement.”), vacated
and remanded, 874 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2017).
87 . See, e .g ., Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The
public interest inquiry primarily addresses impact on non-parties rather than parties.” (quot-
ing Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002))).
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and argue each factor competently. Further, it impedes the gatekeeping func-
tion of each factor by muddying the content of both.
This confusion between the balance-of-equities and public interest fac-
tors was apparent in the district court opinion leading to Winter. There, the
trial judge treated the two factors as interchangeable, noting that the “public
interest outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur (or the public in-
terest would suffer) if Defendants were prevented from using MFA sonar.”88
National Propane Gas Ass’n v . U .S . Department of Homeland Security serves
as an example of the second problem, in which courts allow substantial over-
lap between the factors by reading the public interest factor as a component
in the balance of equities.89 There, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent enforcement of a safety regulation affecting chemical facili-
ties.90 Plaintiffs argued that the preliminary injunction would not harm the
Department of Homeland Security, and thus the balance-of-equities factor
tipped in the plaintiff’s favor.91 The court rejected this argument, stating
“there is inherent harm to an agency in preventing it from enforcing regula-
tions that Congress found it in the public interest to direct an agency to de-
velop and enforce.”92
Complex questions arise when a party seeks an injunction against a gov-
ernment entity or action. Concerns about federalism,93 the separation of
powers,94 and individual rights95 color discussions of the public interest fac-
tor when a government entity is party to the motion. The cases here reveal a
tendency for courts to find that, when the government is a party to the litiga-
tion, the balance-of-equities factor overlaps almost entirely with the public
interest factor.96
A further variation on this government-party trend involves cases with
government entities on both sides of a preliminary injunction motion. In
these cases, some courts have identified a knock-out effect, in which analysis
of the public interest factor is neutral.97 That is, because the government
88. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
89. 534 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2008).
90 . Nat’l Propane Gas Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
91 . Id . at 20.
92 . Id .
93 . See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
94 . See Patrick T. Gillen, Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Governmental Defend-
ants: Trustworthy Shield or Sword of Damocles?, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 269, 279–80 (2016).
95 . See G.G. ex rel Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), va-
cated and remanded 127 S. Ct. 1239 (2017)..
96 . See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 420 (2009) (observing in a stay-pending-appeal
case that “[t]he third and fourth factors, harm to the opposing party and the public interest,
merge when the Government is the opposing party”). The validity of this assertion is addressed
below in Part III, infra, but I mention it here to point out this trend.
97. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 789 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[A]nalysis [of the public interest factor] is not necessary in this case [between a state gov-
ernment and a federal agency], however, because the parties themselves . . . are governmental
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stands for the public interest, in a government-versus-government dispute
the public interest is likely neutral.98 The simplicity of this knock-out effect is
appealing, but a rigid, categorical rule is at odds with the flexibility and dis-
cretion that characterize equitable relief. Further, if the public interest factor
is a placeholder for nonparty interests,99 it seems unlikely that the aggregated
interests will be the same on either side whenever two government entities
are on opposite sides of a preliminary injunction, especially cases where
states sue the federal government.
There is an often unstated presumption that government actions are
taken in the public interest. That presumption may falter in cases in which
government actions run up against constitutional rights. As the Second Cir-
cuit has noted, that presumption is rebuttable, and “once a court finds a like-
ly [constitutional] violation, it is then institutionally well-positioned to eval-
uate whether a specific remedy (that is, a preliminary injunction) would
serve the public interest.”100 The Fifth Circuit, however, found that the public
interest factor favored the Department of State’s strong national-defense in-
terest over a nonprofit organization’s First and Second Amendment rights
when that organization sought to release weapon schematics.101 Surely the
merits of the underlying actions influence a court’s view of the public inter-
est factor, but it is worth noting that there is some disagreement here. The
presumption that the government speaks to the public leads to a “house al-
ways wins” scenario, stacking the deck in the government’s favor.
III. WHEN SHOULD THE PUBLIC INTEREST FACTORMATTER?
In light of the various applications of the public interest factor, this Part
attempts to provide a more structured framework. This Part first argues that
some courts improperly assess the public interest factor using content that is
better analyzed in the likelihood-of-success or the balance of equities factors.
Though the factors do not need to have completely unique content, such
double counting further obscures the public interest factor. This Part then
identifies three structural elements of a case that courts should use to frame
the public interest factor: the parties involved, the underlying cause of ac-
tion, and the scope of the proposed injunction.
A. What Courts Should Not Consider in Assessing the Public Interest Factor
Judicial analysis of the public interest factor should not merely double
count content from other factors. While there can be overlap between the
entities that represent the interests of the public.”). See discussion of this point in Section
III.B.1, infra.
98 . See U .S . Army Corps, 667 F.3d at 789.
99. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 931, 931–32 (9th Cir. 2003).
100. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 112
n.4 (2d Cir. 2014).
101. Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 458–59 (5th Cir. 2016).
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public interest and other Winter factors,102 the public interest factor should
be analytically distinct from the other three. It should not be conflated with
the merits of the case or the balance of equities between parties.
A specific type of double counting occurs when courts improperly con-
flate the public interest factor with a general preference for lawfulness. This
tendency occurs when courts equate “upholding the law” with a general fur-
therance of public interest.103 This double counting was rejected by the Third
Circuit in Continental Group, Inc . v . Amoco Chemicals Corp ., a case in which
a bottle manufacturer sued a former employee because it feared that the dis-
gruntled employee would breach a nondisclosure agreement.104 In granting
the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court noted
that “[t]he public interest warrants protection against the loss of the [plain-
tiff’s intellectual] property.”105 The Third Circuit disagreed; it rejected this
formulation as “not sufficiently specific” and “axiomatic.”106 The court noted
that “[i]f the interest in the enforcement of contractual obligations were the
equivalent of the public interest factor . . . it would be no more than a make-
weight for the court’s consideration of the moving party’s probability of
eventual success.”107 Merely stating that the law is on the moving party’s side
should not impact the analysis of the public interest factor, as that determi-
nation is properly assessed under the merits factor.
Further, when analyzing the public interest factor, courts should primar-
ily consider the ramifications of an injunction on nonparties—not on the
parties themselves.108 To include the harm to the parties themselves would
blur the distinction between the public interest factor and the balance-of-
equities factor. The Winter court used language that obscured this distinc-
tion, describing the third factor as the “balance of equities,”109 rather than
using the “balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant”110 lan-
guage used in other cases. The latter formulation more clearly explains that
the thirdWinter factor weighs the relief to the plaintiff against the burden on
the defendant. When the government is a party to the litigation the factors
102. Consider that a plaintiff very likely to succeed on the merits of her constitutional
claim against the government likely has the public interest on her side as well.
103 . See Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 329–31 (4th Cir. 2013); Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco
Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 357–58 (3d Cir. 1980).
104. 614 F.2d at 353–55.
105 . Amoco Chems . Corp ., 614 F.2d at 357 (quoting the district court judge).
106 . Id . at 357–58.
107 . Id . at 358.
108 . See, e .g ., Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 907 (9th Cir.
2003) (“[T]he public interest analysis in preliminary injunction cases is focused on the impact
on non-parties rather than parties.”).
109. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
110 . See, e .g ., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2948, at 124 (“[T]he state of the balance between this harm and
the injury that granting the injunction would inflict on defendant.”).
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may merge,111 but allowing the factors to merge is not the default approach
to analyzing these two factors.
B. What Courts Should Consider in Assessing the Public Interest Factor
First, when determining the weight of the public interest factor, courts
primarily consider the nonparties that would be directly affected by the in-
junction. The public interest factor is likely to be more influential when the
government is a party to the litigation and less influential when the litigation
is between two private parties. In addition, courts should consider the basis
of the plaintiff’s cause of action in weighing the public interest factor. Rela-
tive to other types of claims, constitutional challenges suggest that the public
interest factor will have a relatively heavy weight in the preliminary injunc-
tion analysis. Finally, the scope of the requested injunction necessarily drives
the public interest weight, with broader injunctions requiring a more careful
consideration of public interest consequences.
1. Parties and Directly Affected Nonparties
Although the harm to the parties is correctly assessed under the balance-
of-equities factor, courts should nonetheless use the identity of the parties as
a preliminary indicator of the strength of the public interest factor. Three
rules emerge from case law on the types of parties that shape public interest
analysis. First, when the government is a party to the suit, the public interest
factor is likely to have a large impact on the preliminary injunction test. Sec-
ond, in private disputes between individual plaintiffs, courts are less likely to
engage in rigorous public interest analysis. This second rule is mitigated by
the third rule: when a nonparty—especiallymany nonparty individuals—will
be affected by the preliminary injunction, the public interest factor is more
likely to be determinative.
The public interest factor is clearly implicated when the government is a
party to a case, particularly the federal government. This is true whether the
government seeks the preliminary injunction or opposes it, though this rule
should not apply when the government is involved in litigation as a market
participant or in a nongovernmental role.112 The rule applies whether the ex-
ecutive or legislative branch is involved, as the Supreme Court has noted that
111 . See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Alternatively, in cases in which the
government is a party, courts may consider the balance of equities as involving only the “ad-
ministrative and financial impact of the preliminary injunction” on the government, treating
the government “in terms of its role as a litigant.” Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th
Cir. 1983).
112. That is, this rule should not apply when a government unit appears in a case in the
same role any normal citizen could (e.g., a buyer of pencils from an office supply store). Alt-
hough not couched in language of the public interest factor, the Second Circuit has required a
stricter showing when private citizens challenge government action taken in the public interest
(implying that government action taken in a role akin to a private citizen would not require a
stronger showing). Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996).
March 2019] Understanding the Public Interest Factor 955
“[v]indicating the public interest . . . is the function of [both] Congress and
the Chief Executive.”113
These considerations attach to all types of government entities, whether
federal, state, or local. Cases involving the federal government will often
raise larger public interest concerns, though, given that a higher number of
individuals will be affected. When states and the federal government appear
on opposite sides of a motion, however, courts should not assume that the
presence of two government entities renders the public interest factor neu-
tral.114 Instead, courts should acknowledge the presence of potentially com-
peting public interest considerations and, in the equitable tradition of in-
junctive relief, exercise discretion in assessing which way the public interest
factor leans.
In related case law on stays pending appeal, the Supreme Court has not-
ed that “harm to the opposing party and weighing the public inter-
est . . . merge when the Government is the opposing party.”115 That assess-
ment is imprecise. First, the government does not always speak for the public
interest, particularly where minority rights are concerned.116 Second, admin-
istrative or litigation costs associated with granting injunctive relief should
be considered under the balance-of-equities factor, creating a separate (albeit
minor) set of considerations for these two factors.117
The public interest factor is less significant in purely private suits be-
tween individual parties, though a satisfactory definition of “purely private
suits” may be elusive. Professor William Rubenstein has proposed a private-
to-public spectrum, noting that “[t]here are not just two pure forms—the
private attorney on the one hand and the government attorney on the oth-
er—but rather an array of mixes of the public and the private.”118 Such a
spectrum is a useful concept for courts in considering the relative strength of
the public interest factor in each case. A straightforward example of a “pure-
ly private” case is a contract dispute between two individuals without far-
reaching social implications.119 In Bender, for example, the D.C. District
Court considered a share-purchasing dispute between a bank and one of its
shareholders.120 In scoping out the public interest implications, the court
mused that “[o]ne can assume that the long-term public interest is in a fi-
113. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
114 . But seeMichigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 789 (7th Cir. 2011).
115 . Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.
116 . See, e .g ., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
117 . See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
118. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Mat-
ters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2132 (2004).
119 . See Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 358 (3d Cir. 1980); In-
dep. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Bender, 326 F. Supp. 2d 36, 49 (D.D.C. 2004). But see Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (barring judicial enforcement of racially based contract clauses).
120 . Bender, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
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nancially healthy and stable Bank.”121 That assumption is likely valid. But it
is unlikely to determine the outcome of a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion.122
A third party in a purely private contract dispute has relatively small
stakes, such as precedential value of case law and shoring up the rule of law.
On the other hand, many third parties might have serious concerns about
the disposition of government-party cases described above. But there is a
rich area between these two extremes. For example, in putative product-
liability class actions, courts have recognized a public interest benefit in pro-
tecting absent class members from misinformation.123 While courts should
be mindful of the broader implications of their injunctions, in many purely
private cases they should apply this private-party rule to minimize the im-
portance of the public interest factor.
Courts should also identify the presence of nonparties likely to be direct-
ly affected by the outcome of a preliminary injunction motion. That is, thou-
sands of people might stand in the shadow of a lawsuit that initially appears
to be purely private. Consider Mississippi Power & Light Co . v . United Gas
Pipe Line Co ., in which Mississippi Power sued its natural gas provider over
a pricing dispute.124 Mississippi Power moved for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the disputed practice.125 Under the private party rule, the case ap-
pears to involve the type of contract dispute that is unlikely to have a weighty
public interest factor.126 But the public interest analysis requires that courts
look beyond the parties to directly affected nonparties.127 Mississippi Power
supplied power to thousands of Mississippi residents who bore the brunt of
overcharging by the defendant.128 Because “the public” would bear the brunt
of these overcharges, the court correctly assessed that the public interest fac-
tor favored granting the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction.129
2. Underlying Cause of Action
Like the parties to a suit, the underlying cause of action also provides
structural guidance for courts addressing the public interest factor. For ex-
ample, the public interest factor is given large weight in constitutional chal-
121 . Id . at 49.
122 . Id . Especially considering that the court was unable to determine whether the bank
(and its shareholders) would be better served by the plaintiff or the defendant winning the
case. Id .
123 . In re Imprelis Herbicide Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11–625–
SLR, 2011 WL 4735758, *3 (D. Del. Oct. 5, 2011).
124. 760 F.2d 618, 619 (5th Cir. 1985).
125 . Miss . Power & Light, 760 F.2d at 619–20.
126 . See id . at 625 (“[A]n issue of the propriety of considering harm to the public when
the injunctive relief sought concerns a private contract.”).
127 . Id . at 625–26.
128 . Id . at 623–24.
129 . Id . at 625–26.
March 2019] Understanding the Public Interest Factor 957
lenges to government action.130 Unless a statute clearly contravenes a consti-
tutional mandate, legislation provides valid and discernable indicia of public
interest factors.131 These are effected through legislative findings, damage-
amplifying and fee-shifting schemes, and laws prohibiting or requiring in-
junctive relief, among other methods.132 Considering the cause of action thus
provides courts with guidelines for weighing public interest analysis.
Constitutional challenges to government action implicate serious public
interest concerns. Numerous lower courts have recognized that the public
interest is not served by the enforcement of unconstitutional laws.133 The
treatment of constitutional challenges to government action is distinct from
nonconstitutional challenges to individual action and confirms the special
public interest weight attached to constitutional claims. Unconstitutional
government actions are an affront to the public interest and provide an im-
perative in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.134 This analytical
move is an exception to the rule against double counting of the merits factor
and is driven by the interrelatedness of the merits and public interest fac-
tors.135 The strength of the public interest factor rises and falls with the valid-
130 . See ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV. A. 98–5591, 1998 WL 813423, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23,
1998).
131 . See, e .g ., 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1) (2012) (“[S]tatutory protection of the right of employ-
ees to organize, bargain collectively, and participate through labor organizations . . . safeguards
the public interest.”).
132 . See, e .g ., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (awarding triple damages to plaintiffs in antitrust
suits under the Clayton Act); 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012) (granting attorney’s fees to prevailing par-
ties in certain disputes under the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also Margaret H. Lemos, Spe-
cial Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782 (2011) (analyzing the effectiveness of federal mech-
anisms that seek to “encourage or discourage suit, or that make it more or less likely that
plaintiffs will prevail”).
133 . See, e .g ., ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he public interest
is not harmed by preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of a statute that is probably uncon-
stitutional.”); Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 92 F. Supp. 3d 314, 330
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (asserting that the government “cannot properly claim a legitimate interest in
enforcing an unconstitutional law”); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799
F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1077 (D.S.D. 2011) (finding that the public interest in enforcing state laws is
secondary to the public interest in protecting constitutional rights and “ensuring the suprema-
cy of the United States Constitution”).
134 . See G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th
Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitu-
tional rights.”).
135. This Note is concerned with identifying what features of a case make the public in-
terest factor more (or less) likely to determine the outcome of a motion for a preliminary in-
junction, irrespective of whether the factor favors the moving or nonmoving party. But an
analysis of when the public interest factor favors the moving party here might note that gov-
ernment action often enjoys a rebuttable presumption of being in the public interest but that
constitutional challenges are quick end to that presumption. See, e .g ., Otoe-Missouria Tribe of
Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 112 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014).
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ity of the underlying challenge.136 Thus, when looking to the underlying
cause of action to determine the strength of the public interest factor, courts
should always begin by assessing constitutional questions. This is because
constitutional challenges to legislation can supersede the otherwise-valid
public interest aims articulated in legislation.137
When a plaintiff’s cause of action originates from a piece of legislation,
courts should use that legislation to give weight to the public interest factor.
In the most straightforward cases, some regulatory regimes clearly author-
ize138 or prohibit139 the use of injunctive relief, embodying clear and binding
public interest directives that determine the outcome of any preliminary in-
junction analysis. Other statutes may declare legislative findings of public
interest outright, providing courts an easy starting point in determining the
weight of the public interest factor.140 “The public interest also may be de-
clared in the form of a statute. A federal statute prohibiting the threatened
acts that are the subject matter of the litigation has been considered a strong
factor in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.”141 Finally, some statutes
create litigation incentives, such as fee shifting or treble damages, that indi-
cate broad public interest concerns.142 When such statutory schemes are at
issue the public interest factor is likely to have greater weight.
Cases involving executive and agency action are likely to create weighty
public interest concerns. Advising deference to executive action in the name
of the public interest, Justice Scalia wrote, “We have in our state and federal
systems a specific entity charged with responsibility for initiative action to
guard the public safety. It is called the Executive Branch.”143 But the public
interest weight given to executive action in preliminary injunction cases is
constrained by, and weaker than, constitutional and legislative interests. In
Reynolds v . Giuliani, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the New York
136 . See Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc. v. Fisher, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108–09 (D. Colo.
1999) (finding that the public interest factor favored upholding a challenged state statute be-
cause the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges were meritless).
137 . See supra note 133.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2012) (limiting plaintiffs pursuing claims under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act to injunctive relief).
139. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (prohibiting suits seeking injunctive relief “restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax”).
140 . See, e .g ., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (declaring a
national policy in favor of limiting environmental damage).
141. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, at § 2948.4. Notably, the cases cited in support of this
proposition involve broad pieces of legislation (e.g., national forest preservation, Medicaid
programs and access, and false advertising protections) that are likely to satisfy the strong pub-
lic interest factor based on the parties involved (or impacted) in Section III.B, supra.
142. Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 197
(4th Cir. 1977), abrogated on other grounds by Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d
342 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that the antitrust statutes, permitting treble damages and injunctive
relief, demonstrated clear public policy goals).
143. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 393 (1997) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
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City government was impermissibly denying them access to federal Medi-
caid benefits.144 The court highlighted that the challenged actions by N.Y.C.
officials did not bear the same public interest gloss as the underlying legisla-
tive actions would.145 This lighter public interest weight in executive contexts
makes sense, especially when executive action contravenes express or im-
plied public interest proclamations by the legislature. In a case challenging
the action of California state officials regarding access to disability benefits,
the Ninth Circuit upheld this view, noting, “We are not bound by the gov-
ernment’s litigation posture. Rather we make an independent judgment as to
the public interest.”146
Finally, a legitimate public interest factor is implicated when courts con-
sider preliminary injunctions that might interfere with previously entered
injunctions of other courts. Though such interference might be avoided
through judicial molding, courts should “avoid issuing conflicting orders”
because of the public interest concerns that are implicated if a party is bound
by contradictory orders.147
3. Scope of Requested Injunctive Relief
The scope of the injunction is the final structural element in this analysis
and implicates the strength of the public interest factor. This element is un-
like the first two because courts can use their discretion to mold the scope of
a preliminary injunction,148 allowing them to manipulate public interest
ramifications of an injunction. Broad injunctions create more public interest
concerns than narrow ones and create a wider set of affected nonparties.149
District courts can and should use their equitable discretion to tailor the
scope of a preliminary injunction. Indeed, courts already evaluate the scope
of a preliminary injunction in deciding whether to grant it.150 In cases in
which plaintiffs seek to enjoin the defendant’s behavior with respect to non-
parties, and the interests of those nonparties are not clear or may even be
harmed, a court would be wise to limit the injunction to the parties before it.
In other cases, for example ones involving unconstitutional behavior by the
144. 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
145 . See Reynolds, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (clarifying that “a distinction may be drawn be-
tween injunctions directly challenging the enforcement of a statute or regulation from those
only seeking the government’s compliance with them”).
146. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983).
147. Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 728 (4th Cir. 1986).
148. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2947, at 115.
149 . See, e .g ., Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511
F.3d 535, 551 (6th Cir. 2007); U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Friedrichs, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1186
(S.D. Cal. 2013) (“Since the injunction is narrow and limited in scope, the Court finds that the
public interest is a neutral factor.”).
150 . See, e .g ., A.H.R. v. Wash. State Health Care Auth., NO. C15-5701JLR, 2016 WL
98513, at *18–19 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 2016); Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med.
Ctr., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1193–94 (D. Haw. 2012).
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government, the public interest may lie in one broad injunction curtailing
the unconstitutional action.151
Cases involving the broadest injunctive relief—nationwide injunctions—
are increasingly controversial. Professor Samuel Bray has argued that courts
should refrain from issuing “national injunctions” against the federal gov-
ernment because they encourage “forum shopping, worse decision making,
[and] a risk of conflicting injunctions.”152 After surveying several legal doc-
trines that are at odds with broad, nationwide injunctions,153 Bray concludes
that “there is no room for the national injunction” in the U.S. legal system.154
But preliminary injunctions have long concerned the public,155 and the effi-
ciency gains of final and singular resolution are surely often in the public in-
terest.156 As long as courts continue to deploy national injunctions, trial
judges should use their discretion to tailor the scope of injunctions, weighing
the factors Bray cites with other concerns, namely efficient resolution of con-
flicts.157
When ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, federal trial
judges should consider the identity of the parties, the substantive cause of
action, and the scope of injunctive relief. This structured approach is not in
tension with the equitable origins of preliminary injunctions but instead
provides a consistent, flexible paradigm for assessing the public interest fac-
tor. Standardizing the way courts analyze the public interest will clarify when
the public interest truly favors an injunction and leave litigants better
equipped to argue their cases. These guidelines leave plenty of room for judi-
cial discretion; reasonable judges may very well disagree about the public in-
151. Such a determination is necessarily tied to the merits of the plaintiff’s case. If the
plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on the merits, and therefore there is likely no constitutional viola-
tion, the motion is unlikely to be granted in the first place but certainly should not be granted
broadly. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill.,
Oct. 13, 2017) (“The rule of law is undermined where a court holds that the Attorney General
is likely engaging in legally unauthorized conduct, but nevertheless allows that conduct in oth-
er jurisdictions across the country.”).
152. Samuel L. Bray,Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 417, 424 (2017). “National injunction” is a term of art, and several scholars prefer the
term “universal injunction.” Howard M. Wasserman, ‘Nationwide’ Injunctions Are Really ‘Uni-
versal’ Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS&CLARK L. REV. 335 (2018).
153. For example, the ability of a plaintiff to use contempt proceedings to enforce a
judgment and the notion that district courts decisions do not create binding precedent for oth-
er district courts. Bray, supra note 152, at 464–65.
154 . Id . at 482. This idea is finding support in the judiciary as well, with Justice Thomas
recently writing a separate concurrence to declare, “I am skeptical that district courts have the
authority to enter universal injunctions.” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
155 . See supra Part I.
156. This is especially true in cases where inconsistent, narrow injunctions will be unad-
ministrable. See Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065
(2018).
157 . See Jackson v. District of Columbia, 692 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[T]he pub-
lic interest is also served by allowing courts to adjudicate claims in an efficient manner.”).
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terest weight to give, for example, an allegedly unconstitutional practice that
affects only one individual. But by thinking through these three factors in
each case, courts will ensure that the public interest is meaningfully consid-
ered.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the public interest factor suffers from a lack of consistency.
This inconsistency is reflected not only in courts’ analysis of the factor but
also in the circuit split on the weight that the factor should be given. Courts
should focus their analysis and weighing of the public interest factor on the
identity of the parties, the number of directly affected nonparties, the under-
lying cause of action, and the scope of injunctive relief requested. These con-
siderations, while not dispositive in every case,158 will bring homogeneity to
this factor while leaving ample room for judicial discretion. This structure
gives substance to the public interest factor, moving it from an afterthought
to the foreground. In working through this framework, courts will spend
more time writing (and thinking) about the public interest. That is a good
thing—for courts, for litigants, and for the public.
158. Consider, for example, that the presence of a clear public safety element necessarily
relates to public interest, regardless of the identity of the parties. See, e .g ., Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 12 (2008).
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